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BACKGROUND AND NEED
The complexity and life cycle of both NASA flight and ground systems
have undergone a significant increase over the past generation. Addi-
tionally, the personnel who possess the design, programmatic and
operational knowledge of these systems are becoming unavailable. These
changes in turn have dictated the need for a methodology (Figure I)
which provides a common backbone for the forms of risk assessments and
analyses which are described in NASA Management Instruction 8070.4,
"Risk Management Policy for NASA Manned Flight Programs". The subject
NMI provides the following definitions:
I. RISK is exposure to the chance of injury or loss. It
It is a function of the possible frequency of the occur-
rence of an undesired event, of the potential severity of
the resulting consequences, and the uncertainties associ-
ated with frequency and severity.
2. RISK ASSESSMENT is the process of qualitative risk cate-
gorization or quantitative risk estimation, followed by
the evaluation of risk significance.
3. RISK MANAGEMENT is the process of balancing risk with
cost, schedule, and other programmatic considerations. It
consists of risk identification, risk assessment, deci-
sion-making on the disposition of risk (acceptance,
tolerance through waivers, or mitigation), and tracking
the effectiveness of the results of the action resulting
from the decision.
Presently, the practiced forms of risk assessment (Failure Modes and
Effects Analyses -FMEA's, Fault Tree Analyses-FTA's and Quantitative
Risk Assessments -QRA's) are labor-intensive and unique to the system
configuration which was investigated. Basically, they do not lend
themselves to easy change following a system modification. It appears
that a need exists for a methodology (and associated tools) which
allows users to:
I) rapidly define and modify system failure paths for both
single and multiple failure sources and targets;
2) provide easy reconfiguration of the system design to
understand its behavior in failure space in light of
design modifications or, in the case of test or flight
operations, its tolerance to the next failure; (Note:
Behavior in "failure space" is the logical definition of
how systems fail as compared to "success space" wherein
functional flow diagrams describe how systems operate.)
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3) quantitatively define and assess risk for appropriate
component, subsystem and system analyses. The program-
matic use of the tools associated with this methodology
also provides an approach to the capture and maintenance
of the system design knowledge. The tools would readily
support design and program decisions, test and flight
operations; and personnel training.
TECHNOLOGY STATUS
During the post-Challenger investigation, the National Research Coun-
cil Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Committee
expressed concern that the 1,300 safety-critical failure points were
not prioritized based on probability of occurrence. They suggested
that an integrated systems assessment be devised which would provide
for failure probability quantification.
Pilot Studies
During 1987, several studies (sponsored primarily by various Space
Shuttle Program and Project Offices) were undertaken to evaluate the
usefulness of QRA methodology, and also identify any areas of concern
not previously established.
Reference I identifies the most significant lessons learned from these
studies. The lessons include the positive value of QRA to:
I) provide quantified risk ranking relative to specified
top-level events;
2) capture "corporate knowledge" of the system-under-study
far beyond their obvious intent;
3) provide a common forum which encouraged inputs from the
various Engineering and SR&QA disciplines;
4) provide a convenient tool for management, in that the
resulting risk hierarchy aids in the allocation of nor-
mally scarce engineering resources.
On the minus side, the magnitude of the project (assessment of Shuttle
systems) taxed the existing software tools to their limit. It was
clear that new software support is necessary, and full flight systems
studies will require expansions of tool capability.
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The final lesson focused on the value of system descriptions for the
failure space models. These descriptions were found to be necessary in
order to define basic failure events. Analysis personnel found the
failure-space model definition to be a labor-intensive paper-and-
pencil activity. The value of the model was also diminished with
modifications to the system-under-study, and the results were limited
to unsharable hardcopy.
Tool Prototyping
The National Space Transportation System Program Office sponsored the
Shuttle Critical Function Audit (SCFA) Pathfinder Study during 1988
and 1989. Its objectives are to provide organization of the Shuttle
Program knowledge base through system diagrams, descriptions and fault
tolerance models; the development of a comprehensive risk assessment
database; a QRA capability; and the development of a user interface to
the model and data.
Directed graph (digraph) modeling is used to provide the medium for
analysis of the failure space models. Modeling experience from this
program has indicated the need for providing a user-friendly approach
to the simultaneous display of conventional system schematics and
failure-space models provided by the digraphs.
Digraph Processor
Presently, the standard for digraph model interpretation is the series
of Digraph Matrix Analysis programs which were developed by Analytic
Information Processing, Inc. The batch-type programs have been found
to be satisfactory in the non-realtime failure-space analysis of large
complex systems. However, the programs require significant manual
effort in analysis of the digraph model's failure reachability infor-
mation which result from the mainframe processing. Presently, the
vendor is developing a faster PC-based version, which will be avail-
able for demonstration, but which still requires manual analysis of
the results.
Another prototyping effort, under the leadership of the JSC Avionics
Systems Division, is the development of a digraph-based failure analy-
sis algorithm. Their Fault Identification and Risk Management (FIRM)
program is currently undergoing beta testing.
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User Interface
Lockheed Engineering & Sciences Company has developed the Failure
Aanalysis Environment Tool (FEAT) which provides the user with a
graphics interface to develop the system digraph models, input them
to the digraph processor for analysis; then display the results in
color either independently or linked to a subsystem schematic. The
prototype tool is undergoing beta testing within the company and
elements of the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC).
The Mission Operations Directorate of JSC has developed the Shuttle
Configuration Analysis Program (SCAP), which provides a ground-based
diagnostic capability for indicated Space Shuttle system failure
symptoms. The tool demonstrates an application which must be supported
by emerging risk assessment technology.
Summary
Present software development accomplishments are indicative of the
emerging interest in and increasing efforts to provide risk assessment
backbone tools in the manned spacecraft engineering community. Refer-
ence 2 indicates that similar efforts are underway in the chemical
processes industry and are probably being planned for other complex
high-risk ground-based environments. However, it appears that complex
flight systems intended for extended manned planetary exploration will
drive the technology.
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TECHNOLOGY ISSUES AND LESSONS LEARNED
I. The protoyping efforts performed to date have indicated
promising concepts toward a flexible and maintainable
risk assessment methodology. It appears very important to
understand and document the various users' needs which
will drive the evolving methodology. The existing proto-
type tools should be used to confirm the methodology
through a series of user-oriented demonstrations. The
demonstrations will result in constructive criticism
which can lead to customer acceptance of the methodology
as it evolves. It is absolutely necessary that the var-
ious users in the Design, SR&QA, Test and Operations
communities become advocates of the methodology in order
to meet the intent of NMI 8070.4.
. The resulting tools must possess satisfactory portability
and flexibility to allow rehosting across computer sys-
tems with no significant degradation in usability. The
goal is to integrate the tools into major program to,l-
sets.
m The toolset should provide for easy user training, appli-
cations development and operations. Although there will
be a need for configuration control in the methodology,
it should not preclude the user From being able to trans-
port his application (via floppy disks, if necessary) for
discussion with members of the community.
.
.
A process for establishing and maintaining validity of
the models must be included in the methodology.
The major using Programs must acknowledge and accept the
costs of implementing and maintaining the tools.
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